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The immigration crisis at the border, since 2016, has seen children
separated from parents, the detention of noncitizens increase, and
record-breaking numbers of applicants denied entry into the United
States. For individuals fleeing their home countries because of
persecution, the hardship has been particularly severe. To start, the
chances of gaining asylum have dwindled significantly. For those who
are successful, a subsequent and crucial question is whether the lawyers
who represent them can recoup their legal fees from the government.
Since 1980, a federal statute known as the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) has allowed for a “prevailing party” to gain such recovery—
but only where the government’s position is deemed not to be
“substantially justified.” What this phrase means, however, has split
the federal courts. The Fifth Circuit, for example, in a 2-1 decision, has
recently ruled that the government’s opposition to an asylum petition
will be seen as substantially justified—even if it loses—so long as the
“totality” of its arguments are reasonable and believable. Yet, the
dissent in this case, and other circuit courts of appeals, have stated a
more lucid principle: where the government loses on the central issue
of an asylum application, it should pay the noncitizen’s legal fees.
Period.
This Article argues that the latter perspective is the more legally,
analytically, and morally sound of the two. The Supreme Court has
opted not to resolve the circuit split. However, this situation presents
Congress with an opportunity to intervene, as this lack of uniformity
has a serious implication. Noncitizens in immigration proceedings do
not have a right to counsel; they are often dependent upon the private
bar for pro bono legal assistance. If the odds are low that lawyers will
be able to recover fees within those circuits that narrowly interpret the
EAJA, then it is likely that the incentive to take up immigration cases in
these jurisdictions will be correspondingly low as well. That some
noncitizens would face greater difficulty in being able to access
lawyers, because their case happens to be within an unfavorable circuit,
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is an outcome that offends the very core principles of equity and
fairness.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the case of W.M.V.C. v.
Barr.1 The litigation involved a Honduran woman (W.M.V.C.) and her daughter
(A.P.V.) who both were seeking asylum in the United States.2 The facts were
1 See generally W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.).
2 Id. at 206–07. Under the Refugee Act of 1951, a refugee is “someone who is unable
or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.” Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Introductory
Note, to UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE, 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES ¶ 3 (Dec. 2010). In the United States, in order to claim asylum, one has to first be
deemed a refugee under Section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a). AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES (June 2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_

2021]

LAWYERS FOR THE UNDOCUMENTED

165

quite brutal. For sixteen years, beginning in 1999, W.M.V.C. worked as a
housekeeper for a police officer in Honduras named Angelica Perez.3 During
this period, Perez violently and sexually assaulted W.M.V.C. on repeated
occasions and physically abused A.P.V.4 The attacks on both the mother and
daughter were unrelenting, but ultimately, they escaped and were able to come
to the United States, where they applied for asylum.5
From there, a complicated legal journey for W.M.V.C. and A.P.V. ensued.
They first had their case heard in front of an immigration judge and then before
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).6 At both these hearings, the
petitioners lost on their asylum claims.7 On appeal from the BIA to the Fifth
Circuit, however, a strange twist occurred. The Department of Justice did not
seek to counter W.M.V.C.’s claim that she deserved asylum on the grounds that:
i) she had a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of her sexual
orientation, and ii) she was a victimized woman in Honduran society who was
“trapped in” an abusive domestic relationship.8
The Government’s decision not to rebut W.M.V.C.’s argument at the Fifth
Circuit rendered the immigration judge and BIA’s decisions below void.9 As
such, she received asylum.10 Because her daughter’s claims were derivative of
her own, A.P.V. also was granted asylum.11
Yet, the story did not end there. Indeed, this study examines another crucial
issue at the heart of this case, one which has split the various federal circuit
courts of appeals over the years. Once the merits determination on W.M.V.C.
and A.P.V.’s asylum request was made, the question then arose as to whether
the lawyers representing them could receive their legal fees from the
united_states.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QNR-N5YP]; see Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012).
3 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 206.
4 See id.
5 Id. at 206–07. For a leading work on the rights of refugees, see JAMES C. HATHAWAY,
THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (2005) (discussing the difficulties
in obtaining refugee status and arguing that refugees are entitled to a set system of rights),
and DAVID S. WEISSBRODT, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS 1, 5 (2008) (discussing
existing treaty and non-treaty principles that relate to noncitizen rights, and applying general
human rights treaties to noncitizens). Also, for an important book on who undocumented,
“illegal,” and unlawfully present immigrants are in the United States, see generally HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 3–5 (2014) (discussing the disagreements
regarding “immigration outside the law” and analyzing suggested solutions), and Stephen
Lee, Growing Up Outside the Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1405 (2015) (reviewing HIROSHI
MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW (2014)) (providing a thoughtful analysis of
Motomura’s book). The petitioners also applied for withholding of removal. See W.M.V.C.,
926 F.3d at 207, 212 (noting the difference between the two).
6 See W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 207.
7 Id.
8 See id. at 213–14.
9 See id. at 213.
10 See id. at 207, 213.
11 See id. at 207.
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government.12 Elaine Goldenberg and Rachel Miller-Ziegler, from the law firm
Munger, Tolles & Olson, represented the petitioners at the Fifth Circuit.13 As
they argued, under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) passed in 1980, their
clients were entitled to reimbursement, since, under the statute, they were the
“prevailing” parties in this “civil action brought . . . against the United States.”14
In June 2019, the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 ruling, decided against the
plaintiffs.15 In its judgment, the majority noted that the EAJA immunizes the
government from compensating the opposing side, when a court finds that the
positions it has taken during the litigation were “substantially justified.”16
W.M.V.C. and A.P.V. initially had made eight arguments for why they ought to
receive asylum.17 Although the government refused to contest the two abovestated grounds upon which W.M.V.C. and A.P.V. won, according to the
majority, because the government did not lose on most of the other arguments
made by the petitioners, overall its “position . . . was substantially justified.”18
“[A]s an inclusive whole,” the government’s case was deemed reasonable, and
consequently, the majority held that W.M.V.C. and A.P.V. were “ineligible for
an EAJA award.”19
The Fifth Circuit has not been the only federal appellate court to
contemplate how best to analyze the EAJA’s fee-shifting provision. Six other
circuit courts of appeals have confronted this issue, with there being those that
have consistently followed this “totality of the circumstances” calculus, while
many others have taken a different path.20 The dissent in the W.M.V.C. case
highlights this alternative perspective.
To begin, in her opinion, Judge Carolyn Dineen King challenged the
majority’s premise that its “totality approach” had been embraced by most of
the other federal circuit courts in the country.21 Her position, she argued, was

12 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 207.
13 For reference on the lawyers of record for W.M.V.C., see Oral Argument at 00:21–

00:33, W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2019), http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/Oral
ArgRecordings/17/17-60753_4-1-2019.mp3 [https://perma.cc/6WDC-4KGS], and Brief for
Petitioners at 1, W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (No. 19–506).
14 See Equal Action to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2012); see also W.M.V.C.,
926 F.3d at 208.
15 See W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 202, 206, 214.
16 See id. at 207–11, 214 (making this point repeatedly).
17 See id. at 207, 210, 214 (noting at the very least, they should receive withholding of
deportation. There are differences between the two petitions, including that asylum can put
a noncitizen on the path to a green-card and ultimately citizenship, whereas withholding
basically places a stay on removal. There is also a difference in the judicial standard of review
for each); DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 3–4, 7 (2011 ed.
2011) (discussing the two forms of relief in detail).
18 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 213–14.
19 Id. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted).
20 Id. at 209 n.4.
21 Id. at 214–15, 215 n.2 (King, J., dissenting).
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the prevailing viewpoint.22 Moreover, as she also noted, “the Government [had]
made only one determination here—that the petitioners must be removed.”23
That the petitioners had offered multiple, “alternative arguments” was
irrelevant.24 W.M.V.C. and A.P.V. had won on the central issue of the case; they
thus deserved to have their legal fees paid for by the government under the
EAJA.25
***
A key focus of this Article is to provide an accurate mapping of how the
federal appellate courts are dealing with this issue of EAJA fee payments. Given
that the majority and the dissent in W.M.V.C. could not agree on what the case
law has said to date, having clarity on where the circuit courts stand is crucial
for properly understanding the present landscape. In addition, because the
Supreme Court has opted not to intervene, the Fifth Circuit’s decision remains
in place.26
This lack of uniformity among the circuits puts undocumented immigrants
in special peril.27 The way adjudication for this population works is that where
the noncitizen’s initial immigration court hearing takes place determines what
circuit will hear an appeal.28 From the immigration court, the case typically is
appealed to the BIA in Virginia.29 If it is appealed from there, it then heads to
the federal circuit court governing the city where the first immigration hearing
occurred.30 In W.M.V.C.’s case, she and her daughter arrived at a border point
within the Fifth Circuit—Hidalgo, Texas.31 From there, they were detained at
the government’s South Texas Family Residential Center before being released
22 See id.
23 Id. at 215.
24 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 214.
25 See id. at 215–16.
26 See W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (denying certiorari).
27 See W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 215 n.2 (King, J., dissenting); Brief for Petitioners at 17,

W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (No. 19–506).
28 For a detailed study on this process, see Mica Rosenberg, Reade Levinson & Ryan
McNeil, They Fled Danger at Home to Make a High-Stakes Bet on U.S. Immigration Courts,
REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-immi
gration-asylum/ [https://perma.cc/EDT8-M5X9]. For a classic study on the travails of
noncitizens seeking legal entry into the country and how immigrant rights are on par with
civil rights, see generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE HUDDLED MASSES MYTH: IMMIGRATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS (2004).
29 For background on how the immigration courts are situated in the United States, see
T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA, MARYELLEN
FULLERTON & JULIET P. STUMPF, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 254
(8th ed. 2016).
30 See id.
31 Written correspondence from lawyer, Rachel Miller-Ziegler to author. Email from
Rachel Miller-Ziegler, to Jayanth K. Krishnan, Milt & Judi Stewart Professor of Law,
Indiana Univ. (Nov. 18, 2019) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
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and then having their case heard in front of an immigration judge within this
jurisdiction.32
But consider that had their initial port of entry been in California, their case
would have fallen within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction.33 Over the years, the
Ninth Circuit has taken a more generous view of awarding prevailing
noncitizens with attorney’s fees in EAJA cases.34 And then there are other
federal appellate courts that have had more mixed records on how to interpret
this provision of the EAJA.35
This heterogeneity has serious implications. Because noncitizens in
immigration proceedings do not have an automatic right to counsel, they are
often dependent upon the private bar for legal assistance.36 Of course, these
cases do not come with great remuneration for lawyers; thus, many who provide
such representation do so on a pro bono basis.37 If the odds are low that lawyers
will be able to recover fees within those circuits that narrowly interpret the
EAJA, then it is reasonable to expect that the incentive and motivation for them
to take up immigration cases on a pro bono basis in these jurisdictions will be

32 Id. (noting that the government found that they had indeed a credible fear of
persecution). For a discussion of a recent case on the procedural aspects of immigration
courts, particularly as they relate to “notices to appear,” see generally Kit Johnson, Pereira
v. Sessions: A Jurisdictional Surprise for Immigration Courts, 50 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
1 (2019).
33 See Rosenberg et al., supra note 28.
34 See infra Parts III and IV; cf. Rosenberg et al., supra note 28 (noting that courts in
the Fourth Circuit rule for noncitizens far less than courts in the Ninth Circuit).
35 See infra Parts III and IV. See generally James B. Nobile, Note, Determining Fees
for Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act: Accomplishing the Act’s Goals, 9 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1091 (1988) (reviewing older studies that examine the EAJA just eight years after it
was passed, but still have important relevance today); John P. Stern, Note, Applying the
Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97 YALE L.J. 1459 (1988) (discussing EAJA
amendments and court cases addressing circuit splits in interpreting portions of the EAJA).
36 See Matthew S. Mulqueen, Access to Counsel in Immigration Proceedings, ABA
(Feb. 21, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/gpsolo/publications/gpsolo_ereport/
2019/february-2019/access-counsel-immigration-proceedings/ [https://perma.cc/86MESQGJ]. See also generally STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY (2019); Kevin R. Johnson, An Immigration Gideon for Lawful Permanent Residents,
122 YALE L.J. 2394 (2013) (noting the importance of counsel when seeking favorable
judicial discretion); Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum
and the Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN L. REV. 413 (2007) (noting that attorney
representation is perhaps the single most important factor of success in asylum proceedings).
37 See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 29, at 795. But see cf. Jaya Ramji-Nogales,
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN L. REV. 295, 301, 301 n.9, 341 (2007) (noting the difference in
remand rates among different circuits, and the 96% success rate for asylum applicants
represented pro bono by firms working with Human Rights First); Rosenberg et al., supra
note 28. See also generally Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV.
1 (2004) (discussing the decline of pro bono over the years).
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correspondingly low as well.38 That some noncitizens would face greater
difficulty in being able to access lawyers, because they happened to arrive at a
particular port of entry located within an unfavorable circuit, is an outcome that
offends the very core principles of equity and fairness.39
This Article will proceed in the following manner. Part II offers a brief
historical narrative on the EAJA. Part III then describes in detail the landscape
of how immigration EAJA cases have fared in the federal courts. Part IV returns
to a deeper examination of W.M.V.C., and why the dissenting opinion ought to
be the approach adopted uniformly across the circuits. There will also be a
discussion of how decisions from other circuits support this contention, as well
as how a 2017 Supreme Court judgment needs to be a key part of the inquiry.
Finally, Part V, the Conclusion, addresses a broader public policy issue—
namely the impact of fee-shifting jurisprudence on pro bono lawyering in the
United States. This study will close by noting how pursuing a legislative route
may be the best way to eliminate the inconsistencies present among the different
federal courts. A statutory solution might also better guide future courts
confronting situations where lawyers for undocumented parties, who prevail in
litigation, seek reimbursement for their services.

II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE EAJA
In the mid-1990s, Professor Gregory Sisk published a comprehensive—and
still what remains the most definitive—treatise on the history of the EAJA.40 As
Sisk explains, the EAJA initially was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter
in October of 1980 and became operative a year later.41 The original version had

38 See generally Ingrid V. Eagley & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to

Counsel in Immigration Court, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 1 (2015) (discussing the small
percentage of immigrants who secured representation, particularly only two percent via pro
bono).
39 See id. at 36; Rosenberg et al., supra note 28. See generally SHOBA SIVAPRASAD
WADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN THE TIME OF TRUMP 2–4 (2019); Sameer
M. Ashar, Movement Lawyers in the Fight for Immigrant Rights, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1464
(2017); Stephen Lee & Sameer M. Ashar, DACA, Government Lawyers, and the Public
Interest, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1879 (2019); Karen Musalo, Personal Violence, Public
Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based Asylum Law, HARV. INT’L REV. 45 (2015)
(discussing the intersection of immigration, policy, politics, and disparities in adjudication
and enforcement); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 37 (discussing how the chance of gaining
asylum appears to depend to some extent on what judge or circuit reviews the application);
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Darkside Discretion in Immigration Cases, 72 ADMIN. L. REV.
367, 374–86 (2020) [hereinafter Wadhia, Darkside].
40 See generally Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act:
Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA.
L. REV. 217 (1994) [hereinafter Sisk, Part I]; Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal
Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney’s Fees for Unreasonable Government
Conduct (Part Two), 56 LA. L. REV. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Sisk, Part II].
41 See Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 136.
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“a sunset provision providing for the Act’s expiration in 1984,” but Congress
permanently repassed it in 1985.42
The legislative history of the EAJA indicates that the primary motivation of
the bill’s sponsors in Congress was, interestingly, to aid small businesses.43 For
example, Senator Pete Domenici, a Republican from New Mexico, who first
proposed the bill in 1977 (which initially failed to pass),44 noted that:
Individuals and small businesses are in far too many cases forced to knuckle
under to regulations even though they have a direct and substantial impact
because they cannot afford the adjudication process. In many cases the
Government can proceed in expectation of outlasting its adversary. The
purpose of the bill is to redress the balance between the Government acting in
its discretionary capacity and the individual.45

The “deregulation movement [that had] gained momentum in the late
1970s . . . [prompted] some members of Congress [to be especially determined
and] focused on enabling private citizens and small businesses to challenge
regulatory agencies.”46 Even President Carter, upon signing the bill, stated:
Many small businesses have learned from bitter experience that when an unfair
action is brought against it by a government agency it may be cheaper and
easier to pay a fine than to fight for vindication. This new law will change
that . . . . Some of the proposals previously advanced were too broad in their
application and too expensive, but this legislation strikes a fair balance between
the government’s obligation to enforce the law and the need to encourage
business people with limited resources to resist unreasonable government
conduct.47

The final bill had bipartisan support. Along with Domenici, Gaylord Nelson
and Dennis DeConcini, Democratic Senators from Wisconsin and Arizona,
respectively, were joined by Representative Joseph McDade, a Republican from
Pennsylvania, and Representative Morris Udall, a Democrat from Arizona, who
both had proposed a parallel version of the bill in the House.48
42 See id.
43 See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 222.
44 See JORDAN LOFTHOUSE, RYAN M. YONK & RANDY T. SIMMONS, EQUAL ACCESS TO

JUSTICE ACT 4 (2014), https://strata.org/pdf/2014/equal-access-justice.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9Z4Q-UP7S].
45 See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 296–97 (citing Award of Attorneys' Fees Against
the Federal Government: Hearings on S. 265 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1980)).
46 LOFTHOUSE ET AL., supra note 44, at 4; see Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 220 n.6,
222; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 191.
47 LOFTHOUSE ET AL., supra note 44, at 5.
48 Id. at 4. Domenici’s 1979 bill passed in the Senate ninety-four to three. Id. McDade
and Udall’s parallel bill was subsequently passed by the House of Representatives. Id.
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However, as Sisk describes, from the moment the statute passed, the
language of the Act’s subsection (d) broadened the availability of obtaining fees
against the government to a prevailing party engaging in “any civil action (other
than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency
action . . . .”49 Indeed, Sisk notes that the Act was “unparalleled among feeshifting statutes in its breadth of application.”50
Still, even with this seemingly broad language of the EAJA, did that
necessarily mean that the lawyers for noncitizens could also qualify to recover
legal fees? In his work, Lowell Baier discusses how the legislative history of the
Act indicated that, early on, influential House members wanted to ensure that
only those who had been “injured, in imminent threat of injury, or [were] likely
to suffer irreparable harm” could receive legal fees.51 As Baier notes,
“[u]ltimately this standard was not included,” which then led to broader sets of
public interest plaintiffs being able to bring claims for lawyers’ fees under the
Act.52 But even if the proposed provision had been added, given the nature of

49 See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 229 (quoting the statute).
50 See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 229, 229 n.70 (citing Susan G. Mezey & Susan M.

Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13,
13 (1993)) (discussing Mezey and Olson, who point out that “most fee-shifting statutes ‘are
adjuncts to substantive legislation’”); see also Susan Gluck Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee
Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Access to Justice Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13, 13 (1993).
Sisk also rightly highlights how the prevailing party against the government can be both from
the plaintiff or defendant side of the litigation. See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 231. In
addition, Sisk notes that in order to receive attorney’s fees, subsection (d) was read to allow
this collection only for an action in an Article III forum, rather than in front of an
administrative agency. See id. at 231–32. At the same time, he also hastens to mention that
“[n]otwithstanding the limitation of EAJA Subsection (d) to judicial proceedings, the
Supreme Court has held a fee claimant under unusual circumstances may recover attorney’s
fees under this subsection for administrative proceedings that are ‘intimately connected’ to
an ongoing judicial proceeding.” Id. at 232–33 (citing Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U.S. 877, 892
(1989)). Sisk does importantly highlight that there is another provision of the Act—
subsection (a)(1)—which authorizes such fees where a party prevails in front of an executive
branch agency. Id. at 233–34 n.95. Note that (a)(1) states:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a judgment for costs, as
enumerated in section 1920 of this title, but not including the fees and expenses of
attorneys, may be awarded to the prevailing party in any civil action brought by or
against the United States or any agency or any official of the United States acting in his
or her official capacity in any court having jurisdiction of such action. A judgment for
costs when taxed against the United States shall, in an amount established by statute,
court rule, or order, be limited to reimbursing in whole or in part the prevailing party
for the costs incurred by such party in the litigation.

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1) (2012).
51 See Lowell E. Baier, Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act, 38 J. LEGIS. 1, 29
(2012) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 96-1005, pt. 1, at 9 (1980)).
52 Id. at 29–30. Note, Baier’s study focuses particularly on environmental
organizations. Id. at 1.
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immigration cases, it would appear that many noncitizens fleeing persecution
(like W.M.V.C. and A.P.V.) would have clearly met the criteria.53
At the same time, the statute’s subsection (d) does contain an “out” for the
government. It states that where a “court finds that the position of the United
States [taken during litigation] was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust,” it can decline to provide the prevailing
party with legal fees.54 While the government has the onus of proving such
justification,55 so long as the arguments made along these lines are deemed to
be reasonable, it can avoid forced reimbursement.56
Since its passage in 1980, and its subsequent reenactments over the years,
the EAJA has been an important law that many scholars have discussed in
detail.57 The next section explores the ways both the Supreme Court and lower
courts have interpreted and shaped the development of the statute, in what might
be referred to as the judiciary’s EAJA asylum jurisprudence.

53 See id. at 29.
54 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
55 See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 250 n.202.
56 See id. at 287, 293; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 196 (having such a criteria in

place, the argument went, would ensure that the government not waste public resources or
the plaintiffs’ time trying to defend positions that it knew could not be tenable); id. at 5 (the
beginning of Sisk’s detailed history of this issue); id. at 195–202 (critiquing proposals to end
the substantial justification requirement).
57 In addition to Sisk’s enormous contributions, for a broad review of the literature of
the EAJA on different areas of the law, see generally Judith E. Kramer, Equal Access to
Justice Act Amendments of 1996: A New Avenue for Recovering Fees from the Government,
51 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1999); Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to
Justice Act—A Qualified Success, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 458 (1993); Dawn C. Bradshaw,
Note, EAJA: An Analysis of the Final Judgment Requirement as Applied to Social Security
Disability Cases, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269 (1990); Hillary Bunker, Shera Finn & Chaz
Lehman, Note, Reforming the Equal Access to Justice Act to Maximize Veterans’ Receipt of
Benefits and Increase Efficiency of the Claims Process, 4 VETERANS L. REV. 206 (2012);
Matthew J. Fischer, Note, The Equal Access to Justice Act—Are the Bankruptcy Courts Less
Equal than Others?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2248 (1994); Joseph A. Fischetti, Comment, Ratliff
v. Astrue: The Collision of the Equal Access to Justice Act and the Debt Collection
Improvement Act, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 723 (2010); Thomas W. Holm, Note, Aliens’
Alienation from Justice: The Equal Access to Justice Act Should Apply to Deportation
Proceedings, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1185 (1991); Macon Dandridge Miller, Comment, Catalysts
as Prevailing Parties Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1347 (2002);
Todd Edward Pettys, Case Comment, Making the Government Pay: The Application of the
Equal Access to Justice in EEOC v. Clay Printing Company, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1575 (1994);
Joseph J. Ward, Comment, Corporate Goliaths in the Costume of David: The Question of
Association Aggregation Under the Equal Access to Justice Act—Should the Whole Be
Greater than Its Parts?, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 151 (1998); and Case Comment, Federal
Government Litigation—Equal Access to Justice Act— Fourth Circuit Holds that Attorney’s
Fees Are Payable to Claimant and Are Eligible for Administrative Offset—Stephens Ex Rel.
R.E. v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131 (4th Cir. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 792 (2010).
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III. SHAPING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EAJA
A. At the Supreme Court
Three years after the passage of the EAJA, the Supreme Court heard what
has remained a pivotal case in assessing the standards under which prevailing
parties are able to retrieve legal fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart involved a group of
plaintiffs who had sued the state of Missouri for poor conditions and treatment
patients had received at a state-run hospital.58 The plaintiffs prevailed in the
civil action (in federal court), and thereafter brought suit to recover legal fees
from the government.59 Note, the statute under which the plaintiffs sought this
compensation was not the EAJA, but rather 42 U.S.C. § 1988 of the Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976.60
Still, Hensley is directly relevant for the immigration context and the EAJA.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, set a formula for how legal
expenses should be calculated with respect to the broad array of fee-shifting
statutes that Congress had passed over the years.61 In Hensley, the lower federal
court held that because the plaintiffs had succeeded on most of their claims
against the Missouri hospital, their lawyers were entitled to legal fees—even for
work performed on those few issues where the plaintiffs had not prevailed.62
The district court’s judgment was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. At the
Supreme Court, though, the majority vacated and remanded the case. In doing
so, it directed the lower court to adhere to the following standard: “Where the
plaintiff has failed to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his
successful claims, the hours spent on the unsuccessful claim should be excluded
in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.”63
However, the majority hastened to add what appeared as a significant
caveat. “Where a lawsuit consists of related claims, a plaintiff who has won
substantial relief should not have his attorney’s fee reduced simply because the
district court did not adopt each contention raised.”64 The majority more
explicitly noted that “[w]here a plaintiff has obtained excellent results . . . the
fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail
on every contention raised in the lawsuit.”65

58 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 424, 426 (1983).
59 See id. at 424. For a discussion of this case, see Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 116–

19, 124.
60 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424.
61 See Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 117 n.722.
62 See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 428; see also Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 116–19, 124.
63 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; see also Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 116.
64 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 116.
65 Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. This point is discussed in Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at
124.
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Influenced by Hensley, the Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Underwood, then
issued the “leading decision on the EAJA” to that point.66 Writing for the
majority and focusing on what “substantially justified” within the statute entails,
Justice Scalia defined the phrase as being one that “could satisfy a reasonable
person”—rather than needing to meet a “high degree” bar.67
Two years later, the Supreme Court heard Commissioner, INS v. Jean.68
With Pierce being within earshot, the Jean Court had to address what happens
when the government seeks to have a separate hearing just on the fees matter
alone. Following a merits-decision declaring the private litigant a prevailing
party, and the government as having no substantial justification, was the former
required to show, for a second time, that the latter’s position was not
substantially justified?69 The Court held that “[t]he single finding that the
Government’s position lacks substantial justification . . . operates as a one-time
threshold for fee eligibility.”70
Hensley, Pierce, and Jean provided an important framework. In 1991, the
Supreme Court, in Ardestani v. INS, then narrowed the scope.71 As the majority
there held, in agency-based deportation hearings, even where a noncitizen
prevails, these particular proceedings do not qualify as adjudications that are
adversarial in nature, which is a requirement under the EAJA to recoup fees.72
Consequently, although Ardestani was able to stave off deportation, she was not
permitted such recovery.73

66 See Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 20. Note, there are nearly 100 cites to Pierce by

Sisk in Part Two of his article. See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
67 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565; see also Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 21–23, 32 (noting
that that the “government’s position, both in its underlying conduct and in its litigation
posture, must have a ‘reasonable basis both in law and fact’” and discussing the Pierce
Court’s justifications for using a “reasonable person” standard rather than a “high degree”
standard).
68 See Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 154 (1990); see also Sisk, Part II, supra
note 40, at 10–12, 115, 127–28 (discussing this case in detail).
69 See Jean, 496 U.S. at 156–57; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 127.
70 Jean, 496 U.S. at 160; see W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 209 (5th Cir. 2019)
(discussing the case), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.); see also Sisk, Part II,
supra note 40, at 127 (citation omitted) (quoting the case).
71 Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 129 (1991); see also Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at
224 n.37, 234 n.96, 242 n.154, 273 n.358, 329 n.723; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 17 n.91.
72 See Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 139; Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 224 n.37, 234 n.96,
273 n.358.
73 Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 129, 139; see also Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1) (1980); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1946); Louise B.
Moses, Case Comment, Immigration Law—Deportation Proceedings—Equal Access to
Justice Act Does Not Provide for Award of Attorney’s Fees Following Deportation
Proceedings—Ardestani v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 112 S. Ct. 515 (1991),
16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 727, 734–35 (1993); James P. Jeffry, Note, If an Alien
Stays, the Government Pays!: Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Deportation
Proceedings, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 161–62 (1991).
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Over the past three decades, these Supreme Court decisions have served as
the backdrop for the lower judiciary as it has grappled with cases that are at the
intersection of the EAJA and immigration law. While occasionally there has
been uniformity along certain issues, in other crucial areas consensus has been
harder to come by.

B. Lower Court Rulings through the Mid-1990s: First Wave
In his copious work on the EAJA, Sisk focuses parts of it on immigration
cases up until the mid-1990s. Consider his analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment in Montes v. Thornburgh, which involved what had by then come to
be known as the “catalyst” theory of litigation.74 Here, “a group of political
asylum applicants challenged new filing requirements imposed by an individual
immigration judge beyond those required by regulation.”75 Recall that
immigration judges work within the Department of Justice and ultimately
answer to the Attorney General (AG).76 However, beneath the AG is a
department known as the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR),
which oversees both the BIA and, below it, the immigration judges
themselves.77
In Montes, the EOIR found that the immigration judge had exceeded his
authority.78 It invalidated his order and thereafter allowed the noncitizens who
had been adversely affected to re-present their case.79 Separately (and
subsequently), they filed a petition to claim legal fees under the EAJA, arguing
that their initial challenge catalyzed a shift in the government’s practice, thereby
making them prevailing parties.80 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, ruling that they were entitled to such recovery.81
74 See Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1990); see also, Sisk, Part I,

supra note 40, at 281 n.397.
75 Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 281 n.397.
76 Fact Sheet: Immigration Courts, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-immigration-courts/ [https://perma.cc/
7BG9-SNXN].
77 See About the Office, U.S. DEPT. JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office
[https://perma.cc/KGJ4-P8PS] (describing how the Executive Office for Immigration
Review operates); see also Wadhia, Darkside, supra note 39, at 375–76.
78 See, Montes, 919 F.2d at 533; see also, Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 281 n.397.
79 See Montes, 919 F.2d at 534; see also Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 281 n.397.
80 See Montes, 919 F.2d at 535; see also Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 281 n.397.
81 Montes, 919 F.2d at 531; see also Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 281 n.397 (“[I]n
view of the limited application of the additional requirements to cases considered by a single
official, this example likely falls on the case-specific application side of the line rather than
the general policy side of the line. In any event, the distinction is not a magical one upon
which the outcome of the prevailing party inquiry should directly depend.”). Sisk also cites
an earlier case dating back to the mid-1980s with similar issues present from the Eleventh
Circuit. See Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 306 n.567 (citing Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Smith, 644 F. Supp. 382, 382 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff’d, 791 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1986), vacated
in part, 804 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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While Montes could be seen as a relatively liberal judgment allowing
noncitizens to recoup expenses, a decision a few years earlier by the D.C.
Circuit—in Unification Church v. INS—was not so generous.82 As the court
there held, where a group of noncitizens prevail against the government, they
must have been the ones who incurred the specific legal fees—as opposed to a
financially supportive nonprofit—in order to make a reimbursement claim under
the EAJA.83
There were then those cases that focused on the substantial justification
aspect of the statute. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Ramon-Sepulveda v.
INS, held that where the government was deemed to have acted unreasonably
and unyieldingly in its opposition towards an asylum petitioner, it would be

82 See Unification Church v. INS, 762 F.2d 1077, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Sisk, Part I,
supra note 40, at 346.
83 Unification Church, 762 F.2d at 1082; Sisk, Part I, supra note 40, at 346–47.
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barred from claiming that its arguments were “substantially justified.”84 The
petitioner was eventually able to recover legal fees.85
Yet this concept of when the government’s positions will be considered
substantially justified versus unjustified has long been tricky for the lower
courts. Sisk’s analysis of the complicated De Allende v. Baker case out of the
First Circuit highlights this point.86 As he explains, simply because an appellate
court affirms a favorable merits decision for the noncitizen does not necessarily
mean that in a subsequent fees hearing the same pattern will follow.87 For
example, where the government is able to show that the position it held was
persuasive in another circuit, then it will be able to argue successfully, within

84 See Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, 52 nn.300–01, 136 n.855, 138 n.864. As Sisk
discusses, this case, moreover, actually had two layers to it. There was a Ramon-Sepulveda
I and a Ramon-Sepulveda II. For the first, see Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS (Ramon-Sepulveda
I), 743 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1984). For the second, see Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS (RamonSepulveda II), 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987). In the former, the immigration judge, initially
in 1978, ruled against the INS in its efforts to deport the noncitizen. Ramon-Sepulveda I, 743
F.2d at 1308. It had held there was no proof that he was, in fact, a noncitizen. Id. Thereafter,
the INS produced a foreign birth certificate, which the immigration judge, and subsequently
the BIA, accepted as a basis for deportation. Id. at 1309. The Ninth Circuit, however,
disagreed, and ordered the noncitizen to remain in the U.S., holding that the birth certificate
was produced too late by the government. Id. at 1310. Twelve years later, the INS sought to
deport the noncitizen again with the same, sole evidence. Ramon-Sepulveda II, 824 F.2d at
750. In Ramon-Sepulveda II, the Ninth Circuit, in granting the noncitizen’s mandamus
petition, held that the INS was estopped from doing so on res judicata grounds. Id. The Court
revisited the preceding cases based on Ramon-Sepulveda’s motion for attorney’s fees.
Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458, 1459 (9th Cir. 1988). In dicta, the Court said that
Pierce v. Underwood allowed for upping the EAJA’s hourly lawyer’s award rate (which was
$75 per hour) where the practice area was considered a specialty. Id. at 1462–63.
Conceivably immigration might well fall into that area, according to the court. Id. at 1463.
However, the court noted that Ramon-Sepulveda II involved a standard mandamus motion,
which did not require specialization, and thus, in this particular situation, there was no need
for the court to enhance the fees of the plaintiff. See id. at 1462–63; Sisk, Part II, supra note
40, at 149 n.945. For other cases that Sisk notes have “stopped short” or actually rejected the
idea that immigration law itself should qualify as a “special factor” for increasing the amount
a prevailing party’s lawyer should receive under the EAJA, see Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d
1066, 1078 (5th Cir. 1992), and Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 149 nn.945–46 (citing Jean
v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1988)). At the federal district court level, Sisk notes that
three courts did not agree to a fee-enhancement on these grounds or because there was not a
shortage of immigration lawyers in the region. Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 149 n.945
(citing Nadler v. INS, 737 F. Supp. 658, 662 (D.D.C. 1989); Chen v. Slattery, No. 94 CIV.
2585 (DAB), 1995 WL 498766, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1995); and Masonry Masters, Inc.
v. Barr, Civ. A. No. 86-201 (CRR), 1992 WL 13208 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 1992)). For one case
where Sisk notes that fee-enhancement was granted, see Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 149
n.945 (citing Lyden v. Howerton, 731 F.Supp. 1545, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
85 For a history of this case, see supra note 84.
86 See Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 86–93. See generally De Allende v. Baker, 891
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1989).
87 De Allende, 891 F.2d at 13; Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 86.
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the circuit in which it lost, that its position was substantially justified, in terms
of the EAJA fees issue.88
Since Sisk completed his landmark study, the federal courts have continued
to hear EAJA immigration cases.89 W.M.V.C., mentioned at the outset of this
Article, is the culmination of an important part of this debate. But there was a
second era of decisions, spanning a little more than a decade, which began in
the mid-1990s. That discussion is of focus next.

C. Decisions from Mid-1990s Through 2007: Second Wave
1. Sotelo-Aquije, Rueda-Menicucci, Ratnam, and . . . Buckhannon
Three key cases involving the intersection of the EAJA and asylum were
handed down by the federal appellate courts between 1995 and 2000. Two
occurred at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, while the first of the group was
decided by the Second Circuit in a case known as Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery.90 In
this particular case, the noncitizen was a Peruvian who arrived in New York but
was arrested and detained for holding a fake passport.91 After being placed in
removal proceedings, Sotelo-Aquije sought asylum and withholding of
deportation.92 The immigration judge and BIA denied his petition.93 On appeal,
however, the Second Circuit reversed, agreeing that he had a well-founded fear
of persecution from the guerrilla organization fighting the Peruvian government
at the time—the Shining Path.94 It held that the evidence was incontrovertible
that Sotelo-Aquije qualified for asylum.95
Thereafter, the noncitizen applied for legal fees under the EAJA.96 The
district court denied the motion, but Sotelo-Aquije appealed to the Second
Circuit and won.97 The court held that the position the government took during
the merits phase had no substantial justification, given the extensive record that
he produced, and thus ordered he be reimbursed.98
88 Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 86–93 (discussing the De Allende case along with the

preceding, merits-based Allende v. Schultz case from the First Circuit, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st
Cir. 1988), together with the Abourezk v. Reagan case from the D.C. Circuit, 785 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1986)—which Sisk then notes was affirmed by the Supreme Court, 484 U.S. 1
(1987)—to support this point made in the text).
89 See supra Part I (discussing the W.M.V.C. case).
90 See generally Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1995).
91 See Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 17 F.3d 33, 34 (2d Cir. 1994). Note, this was the merits
case.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 38.
95 Id. at 34.
96 Sotelo-Aquije v. Slattery, 62 F.3d 54, 54 (2d Cir. 1995). Note, this was the EAJA
case.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 58
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That the government would be seen as lacking substantial justification
would repeat itself in two cases in front of the Ninth Circuit. In RuedaMenicucci v. INS, the appellate court awarded a Nicaraguan noncitizen legal
fees after being persuaded that he would be persecuted (on political opinion
grounds) at the hands of Sandinista government.99 In evaluating the documented
evidence of his suffering while in a Nicaraguan prison, the court stated that these
circumstances clearly “compel[led] a finding of past persecution.”100 It found
that a lack of “a preponderance of the evidence that country conditions had
changed” did not make it obvious that Rueda-Menicucci would again be
persecuted if he returned to Nicaragua.101 Accordingly, the court found that the
government’s “position was not substantially justified.”102
In Ratnam v. INS, the Ninth Circuit also found the government’s argument
to lack substantial justification.103 Here, Kugarajah Ratnam was a Sri Lankan,
Tamil-Hindu who sought asylum for fear of being persecuted by the Sinhalesemajority government.104 While in Sri Lanka, Ratnam had been tortured on
suspicions that he aided a Tamil rebel organization.105 After fleeing the country
and arriving in San Francisco, both the immigration court and BIA refused to
grant him asylum, even though they did not dispute that Ratnam was a credible
witness.106 Both courts deferred to the U.S. government, which stated that it
accepted the Sri Lankan authorities’ rationale that its detention of, and severe
interrogation techniques used on, Ratnam was for national security purposes.107
The courts thus held that Ratnam had not been persecuted on the basis of his
political opinion.108
For the Ninth Circuit, however, this argument flew in the face of its own
“squarely control[ing]” precedent.109 Previously, the court had held that where
state-based torture occurs, even “for intelligence gathering purposes,” it is still
persecution.110 In addition, Ratnam was originally detained because he declared
that he was going to remain uninvolved in the conflict; that itself was a political
statement.111 And finally, because the U.S. government did not affirmatively

99 Rueda-Menicucci v. INS, 132 F.3d 493, 494–96 (9th Cir. 1997).
100 Id. at 494.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 495–96 (noting also, however, that the petitioners were not entitled to receive

a fee-enhancement because specific expertise was not needed in this case).
103 Ratnam v. INS, 177 F.3d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 1999). Note, this was the EAJA case. For
the merits case, see Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 990 (9th Cir. 1998).
104 For background, see Ratnam, 154 F.3d at 992 (noting that he also claimed he was
likely to be persecuted by a Tamil opposition group seeking independence).
105 See id.
106 Id. at 993.
107 See id. at 992.
108 Id. at 993.
109 Id. at 996 (citing Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501 (9th Cir. 1995)).
110 See Ratnam, 154 F.3d at 995–96; Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995).
111 See id. at 992, 996.

180

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:2

offer any counterevidence to what was deemed credible testimony from Ratnam,
its opposition to asylum was held not to be substantially justified.112
These three major asylum cases in the federal appellate courts were
followed in 2001 by a landmark Supreme Court decision—Buckhannon Board
Home & Care, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources.113 Recall that a decade earlier in Montes, the Ninth Circuit had
followed the catalyst theory in justifying an EAJA award to the petitioner.114 In
Buckhannon, the Supreme Court narrowed the definition of who might be
considered a “prevailing party” for fee award purposes.115
Although this West Virginia case did not involve the EAJA, the doctrinal
principle set forth was applicable. Namely, going forward, the catalyst theory
could not be employed as a basis for recapturing legal fees.116 Rather, in order
for one to be considered a prevailing party, the petitioner needed to “secure a
judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree.”117 Otherwise put, a
party that “achieved the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a
voluntary change in the defendant’s conduct” (per the catalyst theory), could no
longer claim legal fees from the opposing side.118
Following Buckhannon, there was speculation as to how this ruling might
play out on the immigration front.119 Two significant federal cases, one at the
district court level and one from the Ninth Circuit, certainly raised concerns
among many observers in those early years.

2. The Post-Buckhannon Influence on the Immigration/Asylum Front:
2006–2007
In 2006, a federal district court in Colorado directly and narrowly applied
the Supreme Court’s precedent in an asylum case involving a Belarus
national.120 In Karsaev v. Chertoff, the plaintiff succeeded in having “his asylum
112 See id. at 993; see also Ratnam v. INS, 177 F.3d 742, 743 (9th Cir. 1999).
113 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc., v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532

U.S. 598, 598 (2001).
114 See supra Part III.B.
115 Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
116 See id. at 605–10.
117 Id. at 600.
118 Id. at 601, 610.
119 See, e.g., Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court—
Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REV. 973, 995 (2002).
120 See generally Karsaev v. Chertoff, No. 05-cv-00266-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 3751440
(D. Colo. Dec. 19, 2006). Around this same period—2005-2007—there were several rulings
issued that were tangentially related to issues of asylum and the EAJA. See Ali v. Gonzales,
237 F. App’x 128, 130 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing two past decisions mentioning asylum to
support the point that staying the deportation of Somali petitioners allowed them to be
considered prevailing parties for an EAJA award); Carbonell v. INS, 429 F.3d 894, 902 (9th
Cir. 2005) (holding that one who receives a court-ordered stay of deportation qualifies as a
prevailing party under Buckhannon and is entitled to a consideration of recovering legal fees.
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case . . . [sent back] to the IJ for further proceedings” following a favorable BIA
ruling.121 The plaintiff then subsequently (and somewhat unusually) asked the
federal district court to stay any future immigration proceeding so that he could
have more time to prepare his case, to which the court agreed.122 Upon winning
this motion, the noncitizen then claimed prevailing party status and asked that
the government reimburse him for the legal expenses he had incurred up to that
point.123
The district court denied his fees application.124 It noted that it had not taken
any position on the merits of the plaintiff’s asylum claim.125 According to the
court, Karsaev was effectively trying to make a “‘catalyst theory’ [argument,]
which was expressly rejected by the Supreme Court in Buckhannon.”126
A year later, the Ninth Circuit issued a different type of EAJA Buckhannon
ruling in Li v. Keisler.127 In this matter, the petitioner, who was refused asylum
by the immigration court and the BIA, asked the Ninth Circuit to remand the
case to the BIA to consider an argument that he believed had been
overlooked.128 The government did not object to this request, and the case was
sent back.129
The petitioner then moved for legal fees, claiming he qualified as a
prevailing party, based on the outcome of the remand request.130 The Ninth
Circuit noted that the end result indeed “constituted material alterations of the
parties’ legal relationships for purposes of Buckhannon.”131 However, it then
pointed out that “the government’s position was substantially justified” in
The petitioner filed for asylum here, but the court made no merits judgment on this point);
Aboushaban v. Mueller, 475 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949–51 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (ordering the
government to pay legal fees of a political asylee whose adjustment to lawful permanent
resident status, which occurred and thus made him a prevailing party, was delayed by the
government). See generally Vacchio v. Ashcroft, 404 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2005) (denying an
award of fees to the petitioner even though he was deemed a prevailing party under
Buckhannon, because the government’s position was seen as substantially justified. Note,
regarding asylum, it was only mentioned with respect to citing the above-mentioned SoteloAquije case).
121 See Karsaev v. Chertoff, No. 05-cv-00266-LTB-PAC, 2006 WL 3751440, at *1 (D.
Colo. Dec. 19, 2006).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at *2.
125 Id. at *1.
126 Id.
127 See generally Li v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
128 Id. at 915–16. Specifically, the noncitizen believed that the immigration judge had
engaged in a “failure to address [the] Matter of M-S-,” which was a case involving how a
noncitizen would “not [be] required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances where he did
not challenge removability, but rather [one where he] sought to reopen in order to apply for
the discretionary relief of asylum.” Id. at 915.
129 Id. at 916.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 918.
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wanting to have the case remanded.132 After all, it was in the interests of both
parties to have a substantive merits ruling on the particular issue that the
petitioner believed had been overlooked.133 As such, the court effectively
negated the petitioner’s prevailing party status and held that legal fees were not
recoverable under these circumstances.134
In the years that followed, several federal courts (mainly at the district court
level) dealt specifically with Buckhannon, the EAJA, and the request by
noncitizens for the reimbursement of legal fees. An exhaustive search of these
district court rulings reveals that in virtually all of them, the Buckhannon
judgment was used to narrow how a prevailing party should be defined for
purposes of EAJA recovery.135 However, the outcomes themselves turned
primarily on whether the government’s argument was substantially justified.136
Where the answer was in the affirmative, legal fees were ruled not to be
obtainable; by contrast, legal fees were granted where the government was seen
as not having a substantially justifiable position.137
That then takes this story back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in W.M.V.C.
v. Barr. The substantial justification standard of the EAJA was at the heart of
the disagreement between the majority and the dissent.138 As the narrative below
explains, the latter’s argument was more persuasively reasoned and should have
carried the day at the appellate stage.
132 Id. at 920.
133 Liv, 505 F.3d at 920.
134 Id. It is important to also note that this case had two other cases attached to it:

Mendoza-Aguilera v. Keisler and Janmohamed v. Keisler. Id. at 920–21. In other words, the
Ninth Circuit consolidated these three cases into one ruling. In these two other cases, the
Ninth Circuit held that the respective petitioners were prevailing parties who had the right to
recover legal fees, because the government in each had not acted with substantial justification
in opposing the respective asylum claims. Id.
135 See e.g., Aguirre-Urbina v. Wilcox, No. C18-1743 TSZ, 2019 WL 6498098, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2019) (attorney’s fees granted); Herrera v. Holder, No. 14-CV-00218PAB, 2014 WL 3672116, at *4 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014) (attorney’s fees denied); Hassan v.
Holder, No. 11 Civ. 7157(LGS), 2014 WL 1492479, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2014)
(attorney’s fees denied); Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder, 713 F. Supp. 2d 929, 971 (C.D. Cal.
2010) (attorney’s fees granted); Sedighi v. Holder, No. 07-CV-1881-BR, 2009 WL 1974508,
at *1 (D. Or. July 2, 2009) (attorney’s fees granted); Chowdhury v. Siciliano, No. C 0607132 JW, 2008 WL 11451190, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2008) (attorney’s fees granted);
Scego v. Mukasey, No. C07-598MJP, 2008 WL 538987, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 25, 2008)
(attorney’s fees granted).
136 See, e.g., Orantes-Hernandez, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 942.
137 See, e.g., Aguirre-Urbina, 2019 WL 6498098, at *3–4 (government’s actions not
seen as substantially justified); Herrera, 2014 WL 3672116, at *4 (government’s actions
seen as substantially justified); Orantes-Hernandez, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 942 (not substantially
justified); Sedighi, 2009 WL 1974508, at *3 (not substantially justified); Chowdhury, 2008
WL 11451190, at *4 (not substantially justified); Scego, 2008 WL 538987, at *4 (not
substantially justified).
138 W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 214 (5th Cir. 2019) (King, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.).
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IV. THE SUPERIORITY OF THE DISSENTING OPINION IN W.M.V.C. . . . AND
WHAT ELSE COULD HAVE BEEN SAID
A. Getting the Precedent Right
For Judge King, W.M.V.C. was a simple case.139 Remember, the majority
had ruled that because the petitioner had only appealed three of the eight claims
made at the BIA level, “the government therefore prevailed on those [other five
non-appealed] issues, [and as such] its position on them was substantially
justified.”140 Otherwise put, the majority stated that it was firmly committing
itself to looking at the “totality of the circumstances.”141 Thus, W.M.V.C. was
not entitled to EAJA based legal fees.142 The majority further remarked that it
was following what “most circuit courts” did when confronted with a similar
situation.143
For Judge King, however, the majority’s line of reasoning “stumble[d]” and
was profoundly “incorrect.”144 She was right. Just because the noncitizen had
eight different claims did not mean that she had eight “separable challenges to
[eight] discrete governmental actions.”145 In reality, the government only had
one steadfast position throughout the litigation: to reject the noncitizen’s
petition for asylum.146 When the government opted not to challenge that issue
on appeal, it lost.147 Period. Furthermore, she disagreed that the majority’s view
fell “on the heavier-trafficked side of a circuit split.”148 As she pointed out,
“when a litigant challenging a single administrative determination does so with
alternative arguments, the success on any one of which requires a complete
remand to the agency, most courts [in fact] focus only on the Government’s
position with respect to the litigant’s winning argument.”149

139 Id. at 214 (noting that “[i]n certain cases more complex than the one at bar,
identifying the Government’s overall position can pose a confounding challenge. See,
e.g., United States v. 515 Granby, LLC, 736 F.3d 309, 317 (4th Cir. 2013). But this handwringing is not needed here . . . ”)
140 Id. at 210–11. For a discussion of the extent to which courts should defer to agencies,
see generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchically Variable Deference to Agency
Interpretations, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 727 (2013).
141 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 210.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 209 (discussing Comm’r, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990)).
144 Id. at 214, 215 n.2.
145 Id. at 214.
146 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 215.
147 Id. at 214 n.1.
148 Id. at 215 n.2.
149 Id. at 215 (citing Glenn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 763 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 2014);
Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007); Air Transp. Ass’n of Can. v.
FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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That W.M.V.C. was making multiple arguments was irrelevant to whether
she could recover legal fees.150 Such a strategy is often what plaintiffs’ lawyers
do.151 Throughout the history of modern American legal education and
American litigation, students and lawyers have long followed the lesson of
thinking in the alternative.152 Moreover, courts expect lawyers to put forth a
menu of arguments when representing their clients.153 Therefore, that
W.M.V.C.’s lawyers engaged in this type of strategy was only to be expected.
Relatedly, there was an additional infirmity to the majority’s rationale.154
Quoting the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Goos v. National Association of Realtors,
Judge King reminded the majority of the reason why alternative arguments are
often made.155 Namely, “litigation is not an exact science. In some cases, the
lawyer’s flagship argument may not carry the day, while the court embraces a
secondary argument the lawyer rated less favorably.”156 And she correctly
explained that courts have emphatically stated that lawyers have a professional
responsibility to present the best possible arguments (plural) on behalf of their
clients.157
The bottom line for Judge King was that there was one position that the
government maintained—until it decided to no longer do so.158 At that point, it
lost and W.M.V.C. deserved to recover her full legal fees under the EAJA.159
150 Id. at 215–16.
151 See id. at 216 (citing Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1386 (D.C. Cir.

1995); Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1176 (9th Cir. 2019) (en
banc)).
152 See David R. Barnhizer, The Purposes and Methods of American Legal Education,
36 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 18–20 (2011).
153 CLERK OF THE COURT, SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., GUIDE FOR COUNSEL IN CASES
TO BE ARGUED BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 5, 11 (Oct. 2019),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/Guide%20for%20Counsel%202019_rev10_3_19.
pdf [https://perma.cc/N8AQ-8LKQ] (discussing preparation of several points in an argument
before the Supreme Court and being able to address issues brought forth by opposing
counsel).
154 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 215 (noting from Judge King: “I fear the majority’s approach
will perversely disincentivize litigants from making alternative arguments. Under the
majority’s approach, a litigant is best advised to stick only to its strongest argument, lest a
weaker (though perhaps still winning) alternative argument be deemed more prominent”).
155 Id. at 216.
156 Id. at 216 (quoting Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1386 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
157 Id. (citing Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1176 (9th Cir.
2019) (en banc); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983) (“Litigants in good faith
may raise alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection of or
failure to reach certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee. The result is
what matters.”) (emphasis added)).
158 Id. at 214 n.1.
159 Id. at 215; see also Wash. All. of Tech. Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
857 F.3d 907, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (using this almost exact
rationale). In that case, the prevailing party appealed an EAJA award it received
“compensating it only for legal services time devoted to the one claim upon which it
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W.M.V.C. was, per Buckhannon, a prevailing party.160 And in Judge King’s
view, the proper reading of past case law from other circuits clearly supported
her position.161
It should be noted that there was one earlier precedent that Judge King
acknowledged could be seen in favor of the majority’s opinion—Gatimi v.
Holder—from the Seventh Circuit.162 Yet, she saw this case to be of “little
persuasive value.”163 Although the Gatimi court, according to the majority’s
presentation, followed a totality of the circumstances approach, in Judge King’s
eyes, it did not explain a rationale for why it opted to do so.164 Without such
“independent justification,” she declared that Gatimi offered little in the way of
substantive assistance for the majority’s judgment.165
succeeded, as opposed to the entire litigation . . . [arguing] that the [district] court abused its
discretion in ordering further reductions from the amount sought.” Id. at 909. The majority
of the D.C. Circuit agreed with the district court. Id. However, the dissent stated:
[The fact that] Washtech raised a number of different arguments against the 2008 rule,
but prevailed on only one, does not matter for attorney’s fees purposes, because that
one winning argument afforded Washtech the result that it sought . . . [thus requiring a]
remand for recalculation of fees without penalizing Washtech for having raised
alternative grounds for relief.

Id. at 913.
160 W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 208 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
2667 (2020) (mem.).
161 Id. at 215 (referring to Glenn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 763 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir.
2014); Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1173 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007); Air Transp. Ass’n of
Can. v. FAA, 156 F.3d 1329, 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also id. at 215 n.2. Note, however,
that there are other circuit cases that she finds as support for her position as well. Id. at 216
(citing Goos v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 68 F.3d 1380, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Ibrahim v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 912 F.3d 1147, 1176 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc)).
162 W.M.V.C., 926 F.3d at 215 n.2 (citing Gatimi v. Holder, 606 F.3d 344, 349–50 (7th
Cir. 2010)).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. In this case, Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit panel in denying the
petitioner’s claim. See generally Gatimi v. Holder 606 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2010). Rather than
being directly in support of the majority’s argument, however, Judge Posner’s main rationale
was to reject the claim because the noncitizen did not file a timely motion, not so much
because of what the majority in W.M.V.C. had argued. Compare id. at 350, with W.M.V.C.,
926 F.3d at 202, 209–10, 209 n.3. However, for another case from the Seventh Circuit that
came out against awarding EAJA fees, see Kholyavskiy v. Holder, 561 F.3d 689 (7th Cir.
2009). In this matter, the noncitizen prevailed on two of seven claims regarding asylum, but
the court ruled that, in the aggregate, the government’s position was substantially justified,
in terms of not needing to award EAJA fees to the noncitizen. Id. at 692–94; see also AlHarbi v. INS, 284 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding by the Ninth Circuit that not
reaching a position on a merits argument “is indicative of [the] . . . view that the
government’s litigation position on the question of Al-Harbi’s actual political opinion was
sufficiently substantially justified . . . ”). Curiously, neither the majority nor the dissent in
W.M.V.C. raised this seemingly more relevant and on point case. See generally W.M.V.C.,
926 F.3d at 202.
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Interestingly, there is a host of other legal support, which the dissent did not
cite, that also could have further bolstered its position. What might be seen as
the “3rd wave” of substantial justification cases from the 2000s at the circuit
level is discussed next.166

B. Circuit Level, Substantial Justification Cases from the 2000s: 3rd
Wave
1. At the Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit, which the W.M.V.C. majority believed had sided with
it, has ruled, on more than one occasion, in a manner consistent with Judge
King’s dissenting opinion. For example, in Muhur v. Ashcroft, a Jehovah’s
Witness from Eritrea asked for asylum for fear of being persecuted on religious
grounds if she were forced to return home.167 She claimed that i) simply being
of her faith made her a target and ii) if she were to practice it openly, she would
be persecuted.168
During the merits phase of the proceeding, Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, found that the immigration judge had blatantly misstated the
law by holding “that one is not entitled to claim asylum on the basis of religious
persecution if . . . one can escape the notice of the persecutors by concealing
one’s religion.”169 Worse yet, the BIA then affirmed without even issuing a
written opinion.170
On appeal, the matter was remanded by the Seventh Circuit with a strong
recommendation “that the case be assigned to a different immigration judge.”171
Thereafter, the noncitizen sought to recover legal fees, and Judge Posner, during
this portion of the litigation, wrote that the remand alone was enough to qualify
her as a prevailing party.172 But, as importantly, he also wrote that the
government had no substantial justification in advancing the position that the

166 Note, this point is italicized and emphasized here, because with the exception of the
Castañeda-Castillo case discussed infra note 205, none of these “third wave” substantial
justification, circuit level cases in this sub-section or the next cites Buckhannon, which is
curious and difficult to understand. Nevertheless, that makes this “third wave” different from
what we saw with the federal cases (at the district court level) cited in notes 120–21 supra.
Moreover, those district court cases cited previously supra notes 120–21 would obviously
not be controlling at the circuit court level, which is why they are not included in the
discussion here.
167 Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 958–59 (7th Cir. 2004).
168 Id. at 959.
169 Id. at 960.
170 Id. at 959.
171 Id. at 961.
172 See Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the EAJA
portion of this litigation following the court’s earlier remand).
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immigration judge ultimately (and incorrectly) adopted.173 Because the
government had been wrong on the law, it had no standing to oppose the
noncitizen’s claim for legal fees.174
Then, in Floroiu v. Gonzales, the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor of a family
seeking asylum, admonishing the government for failing to provide even some
modicum of evidence for why it opposed their application.175 Here, like in
Muhur, the court had remanded the matter to the BIA, with a suggestion “that it
be assigned to a different immigration judge (“IJ”) . . . because . . . the original
IJ . . . had manifested a clear bias against them that had denied them due process
of law.”176 During the EAJA litigation, the court found that because the
government did “not cite a single authority in support of its position,” there was
no conceivable way it was substantially justified in coming out against the
asylum petition.177 Fees, thereafter, were granted.178
And in Tchemkou v. Mukasey, Judge Ripple of the Seventh Circuit, writing
for a unanimous panel, explicitly stated that it is “the Government’s burden to
prove that its position was ‘substantially justified.’”179 And in determining
substantial justification, Judge Ripple noted that it should follow a “reasonable
person” standard.180
In this case, Tchemkou argued she had a well-founded fear of persecution,
on the basis of political opinion, if she were returned to her birthplace of
Cameroon.181 She had suffered past persecution and provided documentation
that she would endure future harm.182 In holding, first, that there was sufficient
evidence of her plight and then, second, that she deserved to recover legal fees,
Judge Ripple criticized the government for its flimsy rebuttal to her
arguments.183 As he said, the government’s “proposition that each of the
incidents of abuse should be considered in isolation,” and thus treated with less
deference than if viewed in a comprehensive fashion, was unsupported and

173 Id. at 655 (“The government cites us to no special circumstances, and offers merely

a footnote of argument that it had a substantial justification for the position it took.”).
174 Id. at 654–55.
175 See generally Floroiu v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2007).
176 Id. at 747–48.
177 Id. at 748–49 (noting how, in fact, the government went on to say that even though
there was this unprofessional behavior on the part of the judge, he “remained impartial,”
which the court saw as both unbelievable and incongruent with the record before it).
178 Id. at 749–50.
179 Tchemkou v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2008).
180 Id. at 509 (stating that “[t]he Government meets this burden if it shows that (1) it had
a reasonable basis in truth for the facts alleged; (2) it had a reasonable basis in law for the
theory propounded; and (3) there was a reasonable connection between the facts alleged and
the theory propounded”) (quoting Conrad v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 987, 990 (7th Cir. 2006)).
181 Tchemkou v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 785, 787, 794 (7th Cir. 2007).
182 Id. at 791, 794.
183 See Tchemkou, 517 F.3d at 510.
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unpersuasive.184 The court concluded that Tchemkou was entitled to legal
fees.185

2. Significant Cases from the Other Circuits
Other circuits too have required that the government make more than just
assertions when rejecting a noncitizen’s asylum petition. In Johnson v.
Gonzales, the Third Circuit heard a case involving a Liberian who argued that
because he had deserted the Liberian army, he would be persecuted if he were
forced to return.186 The government cited the 1992 Supreme Court case of INS
v. Elias-Zacarias as support that this argument was not enough to make a
successful asylum claim, with which the Third Circuit agreed.187
However, upon a second hearing, Johnson, the noncitizen, refined his
position by articulating that his desertion would be interpreted as opposition to
the then President of Liberia, Charles Taylor.188 Here, the Third Circuit had
direct case law of its own stating that such an imputation of a political opinion
could be sufficient grounds for awarding asylum.189 Indeed, it noted that even
the BIA had previously recognized the validity of this argument.190 It thus
granted the noncitizen asylum.191
184 Id. at 510.
185 Id. at 512–13. The court specifically ruled that Tchemkou receive $41,716.84 in

lawyers’ fees and $1,179.94 in expenses. Id. at 513. The government argued that these
amounts were excessive, but aside from reducing the expenses from $2,347 to $1,179.94,
the court disagreed. Id. at 510–13. For another case where a court, in this instance the Sixth
Circuit, imposed the statutory rate of $125/hour because neither the plaintiff’s lawyer nor
the government provided sufficient evidence to support a different rate, see Sakhawati v.
Lynch, 839 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2016). Interestingly, returning to the Seventh Circuit, in
Haile v. Holder, the court found in favor of an asylum recipient, on EAJA-legal fees grounds,
by awarding the lawyer there a very similar amount ($43,349.34); although, in this case, the
expenses awarded were $205, and the legal fees were reduced from the original request of
just over $46,000. Haile v. Holder, 384 F. App’x. 501, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2010). However, the
larger point is that in Haile, the court once again found that the government did not provide
substantial justification for its argument. Id. at 503. This case involved actually two meritsbased hearings (known as Haile I and Haile II). See id. at 502. The main issue was whether
denationalization (here, of an Ethiopian national who lost his citizenship) amounted to
persecution. Id. at 502–03. Based on the evidence in this matter, the court found that it was
unreasonable for the BIA (along with the government) not to consider the facts in this
situation, which would have rendered the noncitizen “stateless” and thereby subjected him
to a well-founded fear of persecution if he were returned. Id. at 502–03. The court ruled that
it was “unpersuaded by the government’s arguments that its position [in opposing asylum
here] was substantially justified.” See id.
186 See Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2005).
187 See id. at 211; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482–83 (1992).
188 Johnson, 416 F.3d at 211.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See id. at 213.
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During the subsequent EAJA proceeding, the government did not budge
from its original reliance on Elias-Zacarias, simply reiterating that it had
substantial justification for opposing the asylum petition.192 The Third Circuit
disagreed.193 It found that the government needed to have done more, in terms
of explanation and rebuttal, and allowed the noncitizen to recoup his legal
fees.194
The Second Circuit similarly placed the obligation on the government to
defend why it believed it was substantially justified in opposing the claims of
two noncitizens in Gomez-Beleno v. Holder.195 The petitioners in this case were
Colombians who had been threatened after refusing to join the anti-government
army known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.196 Fearing for
their lives if they did not enlist, they fled to the United States to request asylum,
withholding of deportation, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture.197
The court, in its decision, stated that “[t]he BIA committed significant errors
of law and fact that prejudiced the Petitioners’ case . . . .”198 It also held that the
government’s defense of the BIA at the Second Circuit lacked substantial
justification, because it had not performed “candid and rigorous evaluations of
the agency’s explanations of its decisions.”199 It granted asylum to the
petitioners and ordered the government to pay their legal fees.200
In coming to this determination, the court was relying on Thangaraja v.
Gonzales, a 2005 case from the Ninth Circuit.201 In ruling that a Tamilian, Sri
Lankan woman deserved asylum because she had a “credible fear of
persecution,”202 the Ninth Circuit found that the IJ, BIA, and government had
all too summarily dismissed the claims she proffered.203 Interestingly, the
government’s decision based on little to no substantial evidence eventually led
to the question of whether the government litigated in bad faith, and simply
stating that the judiciary should defer to the Executive Branch’s position was
not acceptable.204
192 Id. at 212.
193 See id.
194 Johnson, 416 F.3d at 212. In finding for the noncitizen on this ground, the court did

not allow for the lawyers to recover more than the $125/hour rate that the statute generally
provides. Id. at 213.
195 Gomez-Beleno v. Holder, 644 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2011).
196 Id. at 141, 141 n.1.
197 See id. at 141
198 Id. at 145.
199 Id. at 145–46 (quoting Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 2005)).
200 See id. at 146.
201 Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 870 (9th Cir. 2005).
202 Id. at 872 (noting this was the determination of the initial asylum officer).
203 See id. at 873, 875.
204 See id. at 873–75; see also Xue Lu v. United States, 638 F. App’x. 614, 618 (9th Cir.
2016) (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 542 F.3d 704, 713 (9th Cir. 2008)). The Xue Lu
court implied that determining bad faith on the part of the government would be a very high
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But it was the First Circuit’s treatment of Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder in
2013 that provides the most support for the dissent in W.M.V.C.205 The
petitioner, David Castañeda, had spent nearly two decades “mired” in the
nation’s immigration system.206 A former military official who was accused,
but then later acquitted, of being a participant in a massacre of civilians in rural
Peru, Castañeda fled the country in order to avoid persecution that he feared
would come at the hands of Shining Path rebels.207
As the court observed when it heard the case, this was “the
sixth . . . installment” of his litigation that had gone up-and-down the
immigration and Article III courts since 1993.208 Eventually, in April of 2012,
the immigration judge granted him asylum, which the First Circuit then
“directed the clerk of the court to issue a final judgment in Castañeda’s
favor.”209 Castañeda then sought to recover legal fees from the government.210
The First Circuit found that the 2012 asylum order amounted to a court
decree that qualified him as a prevailing party.211 Furthermore, it held that while
the government had defended its decision to oppose Castañeda’s application
early on, its failure to do so in the later cases rendered its opposition to have no
substantial justification.212 As such, the petitioner was entitled to receive EAJA
legal fees.213
***
These above decisions from the various circuit courts of appeals illustrate
how there have been a series of asylum/EAJA cases that have been at odds with
hurdle to cross, as the government’s argument would have to be: “(1) illogical, (2)
implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the
record.” See Xue Lu, 638 F. App’x at 618 (quoting United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247,
1262 (9th Cir. 2009)).
205 See generally Castañeda-Castillo v. Holder, 723 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2013). Note, unlike
the cases from the Seventh Circuit or those from the other circuits cited in this section, the
Castañeda-Castillo court referenced Buckhannon in its analysis of the
immigration/asylum/EAJA issues that came before it. Id. at 56. W.M.V.C. does so too, which
is why it is closely relevant for Judge King’s opinion. W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 208
(5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.).
206 Castañeda-Castillo, 723 F.3d at 74, 78.
207 Id. at 53.
208 Id. at 52–55.
209 Id. at 55.
210 Id. at 56.
211 Id. at 59.
212 See Castañeda-Castillo, 723 F.3d at 66, 73.
213 Id. Note, during this two-decade process, Castañeda had, as part of his litigation, a
claim fighting the government’s efforts to extradite him back to Peru and one relating to a
habeas petition. Id. at 55. The court held that he could not gain EAJA-fees for either of these,
and that for the amount he could recover, he was not permitted to claim an “enhanced award”
because he “failed to establish that his attorneys possessed some ‘specialized skill’ or
‘distinctive knowledge’ needful for the litigation in question.” Id. at 74–76.
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the Fifth Circuit’s majority in W.M.V.C. Even though Judge King did not cite
these rulings, their weight lies clearly in favor of her dissenting opinion. Beyond
just these asylum matters, there was a seminal judgment handed down by the
Supreme Court in 2017, which is directly relevant for this discussion.
Surprisingly, it evaded mention by either the majority or the dissent in W.M.V.C.

C. The Goodyear Decision
In Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company v. Haeger, the plaintiffs (the
Haegers) had their “motorhome swerve[] off the road and flip[] over.”214 They
brought a cause of action against Goodyear claiming that the tires the company
produced had malfunctioned.215 What ensued was a contentious period of
discovery, in which Goodyear aggressively resisted providing documents on
internal tests of the tires that the Haegers believed were defective.216 Eventually,
a settlement was reached.217
During a subsequent case that Goodyear was litigating, not involving the
Haegers, incriminating materials were released on those same tires, which then
came into the Haegers’ possession.218 They returned to court asking for legal
fees for the entire time that they had been in battle with Goodyear.219 They
asserted that the company had engaged in intentional deception, fraud, and
professional misconduct.220 The district court agreed and awarded $2.7 million
to the Haegers, relying on its inherent judicial powers.221 The district court held
that the defendant had engaged in “truly egregious” behavior, and the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the sum.222
In 2017, the Supreme Court reversed, ordering the lower court to rehear the
matter.223 In her opinion for a unanimous bench, Justice Kagan stated that the
214 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1184 (2017).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1184. Faegre Drinker produced a paper analyzing this case.

See generally Brian J. Paul & Chuck Webber, Supreme Court Decides Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Haeger, FAEGRE DRINKER (Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.faegredrinker.com/
en/insights/publications/2017/4/supreme-court-decides-goodyear-tire-rubber-co-v-haeger
[https://perma.cc/55Q7-KDC6].
221 See Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1185. As the Supreme Court noted,
the District Court also made a ‘contingent award’ in the event that the Court of Appeals
reversed its preferred one . . . reduced to $2 million. The deduction of $700,000, which
was based on estimates Goodyear offered, represented fees that the Haegers incurred in
developing claims against other defendants and proving their own medical damages.

Id.
222 Id. at 1185 (quoting the district court).
223 Id. at 1190.
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district court had the authority to find in favor of the Haegers, regarding their
request for legal fees, particularly since bad-faith behavior was present.224
However, her ruling also noted that in its calculation, the district court should
have only factored in “compensatory rather than punitive” damages in reaching
its conclusion.225 Relying on past case law—particularly Mine Workers v.
Bagwell and Fox v. Vice—Justice Kagan held that there needed to be a causal
nexus between Goodyear’s bad acts and the ensuing legal fees that the Haegers
incurred.226 Otherwise put, the Haegers could recoup only the amount they
“‘would not have paid but for’ the misconduct” of Goodyear.227
The Goodyear case did not involve the EAJA. There was no government
actor as the defendant, no discussion of “substantial justification,” and no
mention of immigration or asylum. Buckhannon was not invoked either. Instead,
this case involved plaintiffs who were private citizens and a defendant that was
a large, global company.228 If anything, determining what amount of legal fees
could be obtained by the Haegers, due to Goodyear’s bad-faith behavior, looked
to be a standard Rule 11, federal civil procedure matter.229
Yet, rather than focusing on such a “[r]ule-based” mechanism for punishing
the company, or relying on “statutory sanction regimes,” Justice Kagan looked
to a third source—the “federal court’s inherent authority to sanction a litigant
224 See id. at 1186–87. Note, Justice Gorsuch did not participate in this case. Id. at 1190.
225 Id. at 1186 (citing Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–

30 (1994)).
226 See id. 1186–88.
227 Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1187 (quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 836 (2011)).
228 Id. at 1184.
229 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) discusses the sanctions for violating Rule 11(b), which states:
REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion,
or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an
attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1)
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary
delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the
factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, will likely
have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and (4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Thereafter, Rule 11(c) states:
(1) In General. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court
determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate
sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for
the violation. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly
responsible for a violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.

FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1).
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for bad-faith conduct . . . .”230 Her opinion treated these three methods of
punishment on a continuum. As she noted, each of the systems “similarly
require courts to find such a causal connection [between the bad behavior and
legal costs accrued by the other side] before shifting fees.”231
So how might the Court’s approach here be related to whether successful
asylum applicants are entitled to legal fees? Consider a 2019 decision by the
Ninth Circuit, entitled Lu v. United States, which involved two Chinese women
who were petitioning for asylum.232 The noncitizens had submitted their
applications to the same asylum officer.233 The first woman was promised an
affirmative outcome if she performed sexual acts for the officer; after she
refused, her application was denied.234 The officer later made sexual advances
against the second woman, promising her an affirmative outcome in exchange
for a cash bribe.235
The women were both represented by the same immigration attorney.236
The attorney complained about the officer’s behavior to the Department of
Justice, which subsequently launched an investigation.237 Shortly afterwards,
the second of the noncitizen applicants agreed to participate in a sting operation,
which led to the officer’s arrest, indictment, and conviction for civil rights and
bribery violations.238
The two women then brought a civil suit against the officer and the
government on eight different grounds.239 Initially, their claims were dismissed,
but on appeal, the Ninth Circuit allowed them to proceed on two of the claims.240
230 See Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1183–84, 1186 n.5.
231 Id. at 1186 n.5. This point is underscored when Justice Kagan subsequently cites the

above-mentioned Fox v. Vice case. See id. at 1187. That precedent directly involved a
prevailing party (in that case the defendant) who “sought reimbursement under a fee-shifting
statute for legal expenses incurred in defending against several frivolous claims.” Id. (citing
Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 830 (2011)) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1988). As the Fox Court
held, where a party would have paid legal fees regardless of the bad-faith actions of the other
side, that party cannot be compensated for those particular costs even if it prevails in the
lawsuit. Id. In Fox, the defendant argued that he was forced to stave off “frivolous claims,”
and because he prevailed he deserved legal fees. Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 830 (2011).
232 Lu v. United States, 921 F.3d 850, 854–55 (9th Cir. 2019).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 855.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Lu, 921 F.3d at 855.
239 Id. at 855–56 (noting the “complaint alleged: (1) deprivation of constitutional rights,
(2) negligence, (3) sexual battery, (4) assault and battery, (5) intentional infliction of
emotional distress, (6) cruel and inhumane and degrading treatment, (7) interference with
the right to seek asylum, and (8) gender discrimination, harassment, and violence against
women”).
240 Id. (noting the two claims on which the appeals court allowed them to proceed were
intentional infliction of emotional distress and a civil rights provision under the California
Civil Code that involved having their right to asylum interfered with).
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On remand, the district court awarded $500,000 and $700,000 in damages to the
two plaintiffs, respectively.241
Still, “the outcome of the case was bittersweet.”242 The lead plaintiff,
according to her lawyer, “was never given a second chance with a second
asylum officer.”243 She was forced to return to China, even though she had
cooperated and testified against the defendant.244 The other plaintiff,
fortunately, received asylum and was allowed to remain in the United States.245
After this saga ended, the lawyer for the noncitizens petitioned for legal
fees, on behalf of his clients, under the EAJA.246 On this issue, the district court
set forth an initial judgement of over $880,000, which was not surprising given
that it took some fifteen years to receive the final damages award.247 The Ninth
Circuit remanded for reconsideration.248 The district court then ordered that the
fees actually be raised to nearly $1 million, and the government appealed
again.249
This time around, the Ninth Circuit took judicial notice of Goodyear. As it
stated, Justice Kagan’s opinion “shed a new light on the framework for awarding
attorneys’ fees as sanctions, which is equally applicable to an award of fees
under § 2412(b)” of the EAJA.250 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit sent the case
back to the district court with instructions that it use the Goodyear analysis in
calculating the fees liability of the government.251 The matter remains pending
as of this writing.

241 Id. at 856.
242 See Maria Dinzeo, Damages for Putting Up with Pervy INS Officer, COURTHOUSE

NEWS SERV. (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.courthousenews.com/damages-for-putting-upwith-pervy-ins-officer/ [https://perma.cc/5AKR-5MFY].
243 Id. (quoting lawyer Vincent James DeSimone).
244 Id.; see also Lu, 921 F.3d at 855 n.1.
245 See Lu, 921 F.3d at 856 n.4.
246 See id. at 856–57 (discussing fees under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) and (d)).
247 See id. at 857. Xue Lu filed her application for asylum in 1997 and Jie Hao filed hers
in 2000. Id. at 854–55. The $1.2 million in damages was awarded by the district court in
2013. Id. at 856.
248 Id. at 857. In its remand, the Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to reconsider
whether, in fact, “the government argued in bad faith that the intentional tort exception barred
Plaintiffs’ claims,” which was the finding of the district court. Id. (quoting Xue Lu v. United
States, 638 F. App’x 614, 618 (2016)). For the Ninth Circuit, this ruling was “without support
in the record.” Id.
249 Id. at 858 (noting that the sum (specifically of $993,758) was arrived at by “‘evidence
submitted by Plaintiffs [that] demonstrate[d] $676,751 in fees expended in the underlying
action [was] traceable to one or more of the three findings of bad faith by the
Government’ . . . [together with] ‘$314,651 in fees expended on the second appeal and postremand . . . [which was held to be] traceable to one or more of the three findings of bad faith
by the Government’”).
250 Id.
251 Lu, 921 F.3d at 864.
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***
The natural question to ask is whether the district court in Xue Lu will arrive
at a fees award lower than its two previous totals because of Goodyear. Beyond
the public statement made by the lawyer for the first plaintiff, there is little
information available as to why she was refused asylum. On its face, it appears
inconceivable that she could have been denied, and at the very least, it is
certainly curious. So how Goodyear will affect her claim is difficult to say.
But regarding the second plaintiff, Goodyear may work in her favor, which
could bode well for future noncitizens who are granted asylum and are looking
to recoup legal fees. According to Justice Kagan, where “abuse,”
“misbehavior,” “frivolous,” or “bad-faith conduct” by one party results in the
second party expending fees that otherwise would not have been incurred, the
former is responsible for paying back these expenses to the latter.252
The vast majority of precedent discussed above shows that in contested
cases where noncitizens have been granted asylum, the government’s opposition
has not been substantially justified. Given this reality, it is not a far stretch to
add “a lack of substantial justification” to Justice Kagan’s list. After all, “but
for” the government’s unjustified actions here, the second plaintiff in Lu would
have received asylum and would not have spent time and money on any of the
litigation to which she was a party.253 Perhaps then, the following presumption
should be employed going forward: where the government loses at the meritsphase of an asylum hearing, it will be obliged to reimburse the noncitizen for
legal fees.

V. CONCLUSION
Doctrinal consistency and fundamental notions of fairness point to a hope
that the Supreme Court will one day resolve the differences among the federal
courts and adopt the reasoning of Judge King’s dissent. Moreover, the additional
evidence amassed in this Article shows that there is overwhelming support for
abandoning the “totality of circumstances” approach altogether.
However, on W.M.V.C., in particular, the Court has opted not to
intervene.254 Yet, there is still another route asylum advocates may wish to
pursue. In particular, seeking a statutory solution might provide an equally
important, if not better, remedy. Under the EAJA, defining what “substantially
justified” means has proven to be fraught with difficulties.255 But Congress
could fix this problem. Drawing on what was just stated above, it could remove
the substantial justification requirement from the law and simply say that
252 See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186–88 (2017).
253 Cf. Lu, 921 F.3d at 855–56 (noting the asylum officer’s conduct, the litigation, and

the resultant delay in the second plaintiff’s asylum application).
254 See W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2667
(2020) (mem.).
255 See supra Parts I, III, and IV(b).
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whenever a noncitizen is granted asylum over the objections of the government,
legal fees are automatically recoverable.256
Other fee-shifting statutes permit prevailing parties to recoup costs in this
manner.257 Hirsch and Sheehy, in their comprehensive review, in fact, note that
there are only “a few exceptions . . . (e.g., the Equal Access to Justice Act)” that
include additional criteria that prevailing parties must meet.258 Given the
difficulty of determining whether or not the government’s arguments are
substantially justified in asylum cases, courts might likely embrace this type of
statutory clarification.
A key issue, of course, is that the EAJA is not just a law focused on asylum.
Its application spans the policy spectrum. In these other categories of cases,
courts have faced similar dilemmas regarding the issue of substantial
justification.259 With the law now being in place for forty years, accompanied
by a tome of precedent across the board, the reality is that Congress will
probably not remove this element from the statute.
That said, there is another legislative avenue to consider. In November of
2019, a bill was put forth by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Representative
Zoe Lofgren (D-Cal. 19) who introduced the Refugee Protection Act.260 As

256 While not discussing fee-shifting, attorney’s fees, or the EAJA, see Wadhia,

Darkside, supra note 39, at 369–70, who does make the argument that to combat what she
calls the “Darkside Discretion” of federal agencies that adjudicate on immigration matters,
such as asylum, “that Congress eliminate discretion or, in the alternative, create a rebuttable
presumption in favor of noncitizens in cases where they have met the statutory criteria.” Id.
She also argues that this type of “discretionary component . . . [is present in] cancellation of
removal, adjustment of status, . . . waivers of inadmissibility,” and waivers under the travel
ban. See id. at 371, 414.
257 For a valuable literature of fee shifting statutes, see generally ALAN HIRSCH & DIANE
SHEEHY, AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND MANAGING FEE LITIGATION (2d ed. 2005),
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/AttFees2.pdf [https://perma.cc/DC73-4YGK];
William A. Bradford, Jr., Private Enforcement of Public Rights: The Role of Fee-Shifting
Statutes in Pro Bono Lawyering, in THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 125 (Robert A.
Katzmann ed., 1995); Bruce Fein, Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical
Examination of Government-“Subsidized” Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211
(1984); John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery,
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984); Mezey & Olson, supra note 50; Frances Kahn
Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
187 (1984); Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in
Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1984). For his opposition to
this point, see Sisk, Part II, supra note 40, at 194–207.
258 See HIRSCH & SHEEHY, supra note 257, at 5 & n.12; see also Wadhia, Darkside,
supra note 39, at 376–86 (focusing not specifically on this issue that Hirsch and Sheehy
analyze, rather discussing “Hefty Statutory Requirements” as they generally pertain to
asylum cases).
259 For a comprehensive discussion of other such cases, see generally Sisk, Part I, supra
note 40, and Sisk, Part II, supra note 40.
260 See Press Release, Zoe Lofgren, Rep., House of Representatives, Leahy & Lofgren
Introduce Bicameral Refugee Protection Act (Nov. 21, 2019), https://lofgren.house.gov/
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Karen Musalo writes: “The bill lays out a plan to allow women and girls fleeing
gender-based violence the opportunity to obtain asylum, and bring our country
back in line with its humanitarian commitments.”261 Musalo continues that: “It’s
a vision that all members of Congress should be able to get behind, even at a
time of bitter partisanship.”262
Co-sponsored by sixteen Senators and thirty-one members of the House, the
bill has an even broader goal in mind, in terms of asylum.263 Namely, it takes
an earlier iteration of a similar Congressional proposal from 2016 and provides
a “comprehensive blueprint for restoring and reinvigorating [the] U.S. refugee
and asylum systems . . . .”264 Two aspects of the proposed legislation are
especially relevant: a focus on admissions into the country; and enhanced legal
protections for those who enter, with a particular emphasis on victims of
domestic violence.265
First, the bill established “an annual refugee admission goal of at least
95,000—the historic average under all administrations since the creation of
USRAP” in the 1980 Refugee Act.266 In fiscal year 2019, the Trump
Administration admitted only about 30,000 refugees, and for 2020 it planned to
cut that number to 18,000.267 The proposed bill, therefore, would have raised
that limit nearly five times from the Trump Administration’s 2020 target.

media/press-releases/leahy-lofgren-introduce-bicameral-refugee-protection-act-2019
[https://perma.cc/6X6G-U3XK].
261 See Karen Musalo, Opinion, Restore Asylum for Women Fleeing Abuse and Death,
L.A. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-11-22/asylumimmigration-women-violence-congress?utm_source=Today%27s+Headlines&utm_cam
paign=aaa5356aca-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2016_12_12_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&
utm_term=0_b04355194f-aaa5356aca-76278113 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal). For
a broader, historical discussion, see JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 157–58 (2011)
(noting that Congress has historically had primary authority to govern immigration matters).
262 See supra note 261.
263 See Lofgren, supra note 260; see also, Musalo, supra note 261.
264 See Lofgren, supra note 260.
265 See THE REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT OF 2019, https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Refugee%20Protection%20Act%20of%202019%20one%20pager.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KC7N-4TQT].
266 Id. (noting how the proposed new act “[b]olsters [the] U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program”). This program “is an interagency effort involving a number of governmental and
non-governmental partners both overseas and in the United States.” The United States
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) Consultation and Worldwide Processing Priorities,
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
refugees-and-asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-program-usrap-consul
tation-and-worldwide-processing-priorities [https://perma.cc/B5JC-AXFM]. For a study
that discusses the inter-workings of the administrative process in immigration, see generally
Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in Immigration
Law, 69 ADMIN L. REV. 347 (2017).
267 See Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About Refugees to the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.
(Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/07/key-facts-about-refugees
-to-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/V264-ND9X].

198

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:2

Second, the bill allows asylum applicants to be released on their own
recognizance if they are of no threat.268 Additionally, it gives special legal status
to “domestic violence . . . claims.”269 And it reverses a decision made by then
Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who unilaterally overturned the BIA in a case
known as Matter of A-B-, in 2018.270 As Musalo has noted, in “a highly unusual
procedural move, Sessions seized upon A.B.’s case, overturned the grant of
asylum, and used it to declare that the United States should no longer extend
protection to domestic violence survivors.”271
The new Leahy and Lofgren bill, though, would allow for these victims to
assert their rights under the Violence Against Women Act.272 It also states that
if the noncitizen’s claims are denied by an immigration judge, the BIA, or the
Attorney General, there would be recourse for the case to be heard by an
Article III judge.273
What the new proposal, however, did not offer was compensation for legal
fees. One reason may be because the bill mandated that the Attorney General
provide lawyers for “children and vulnerable individuals.”274 Furthermore, the
Department of Justice is required to make available legal awareness programs
for noncitizens who are detained.275
Therefore, it could be that the drafters thought it was not necessary to have
a fee-shifting clause here. Yet, the problem is that mandating the Attorney
General to provide lawyers for asylum seekers is unrealistically aspirational.
Unless both chambers of Congress and the White House fall into the same
ideological hands, it is difficult to imagine a situation where, in this current
political environment, such a proposal would: i) pass, and ii) even if it does, be
well received by noncitizen claimants (and civil society activists) who would be
268 See THE REFUGEE PROTECTION ACT OF 2019, supra note 265.
269 Id.
270 See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 346 (A.G. 2018), abrogated by Grace v.

Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 895–900 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
271 Musalo, supra note 261. Note, according to Sessions, his ruling would not apply to
acts of persecution by state actors, just private actors. Cf. Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at
337–38 (primarily discussing standards for victims of private violence). But this distinction
is cold comfort for someone like W.M.V.C., because while her abuser was a police officer
and thus a public actor, the lines were blurred, because the persecution was done within a
private, residential setting. See W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2667 (2020) (mem.); see also Jennifer Chang Newell, Federal Judge
Blocks Trump’s Policy Gutting Asylum for People Fleeing Domestic and Gang Violence,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/
federal-judge-blocks-trumps-policy-gutting-asylum-people-fleeing-domestic-and [https://
perma.cc/TL2X-7DNW].
272 See S. 2936, 116th Cong. § 125 (2019).
273 See Musalo, supra note 261; see also S. 2936, 116th Cong. § 132 (2019).
274 See S. 2936, 116th Cong. § 113(a)(3) (2019).
275 Id. § 113(b)(2)–(3). While it appears that the Department can undertake this initiative
on its own, the bill does also state that it “shall enter into 1 or more contracts with 1 or more
nongovernmental community-based organizations for the provision of the[se] legal
orientation programs . . . .” Id. § 113(b)(2)(C).
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asked to entrust their legal futures to a government institution that is
simultaneously seeking to remove them from the country.
For this reason, it makes sense to add a fee-shifting provision to the new
bill, without the substantial justification component. Such an inclusion could
borrow from the range of statutes that award legal fees to parties just on the basis
of prevailing in litigation.276 Following this route would avoid the complications
that the various federal circuit courts have encountered in the EAJA cases
discussed above. And it may encourage another normatively important value
that the ABA has sought to promote: pro bono legal work.
Scott Cummings has written extensively on pro bono lawyering in the
United States.277 According to Cummings, during the early part of the twentieth
century, legal aid for the socioeconomically disadvantaged, including
immigrants, was done by charity-based groups that had volunteer-lawyers who
helped on an ad hoc basis.278 The bar did not engage in deep, sustained
assistance.279 With the rise of different social and civil rights movements in the
1960s and 1970s, the context changed. There were now streams of funding from
Congress, and legal aid for the poor become more structured and organized.280
But beginning with the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, federal money for
these initiatives declined, resulting in the American Bar Association, its state
counterparts, and civil society lawyers taking up the mantle to financially
support and promote pro bono work.281
At present, the organized bar is at a critical juncture. Various reports
indicate that there have not been enough lawyers at the border to meet the needs
of this most desperate of populations.282 For those who are there, they are

276 See generally HIRSCH & SHEEHY, supra note 257 (discussing fee-shifting statutes).
For another approach to helping noncitizens, see generally BILL ONG HING, JENNIFER M.
CHACÓN & KEVIN R. JOHNSON, IMMIGRATION LAW AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (2018) (considering
immigration through a social justice lens).
277 See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 37, at 1; see also Scott L. Cummings, UCLA SCH.
L., https://law.ucla.edu/faculty/faculty-profiles/scott-l-cummings [https://perma.cc/BR6N54M2] (listing Professor Cummings’s scholarship).
278 Cummings, supra note 37, at 11.
279 See id. at 11–12.
280 Id. at 15–16.
281 See id. at 18–19, 25.
282 See e.g., ABA President Calls for Lawyer Volunteers at Border Projects, ABA (Apr.
1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration/job -andvolunteer-opportunities-/volunteer-at-the-border/ [https://perma.cc/SE75-LDBS]; Angelina
Chapin, The Border Area Is in Dire Need of Lawyers to Represent Asylum-Seekers,
HUFFPOST (July 5, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/the-border-area-is-in-dire-needof-lawyers-to-represent-asylum-seekers_n_5b3bda54e4b07b827cbbb2f7 [https://perma.cc/
UK89-YTGZ]; Hannah Hayes, At the Border and Beyond: Women Lawyers Defend
Unprecedented Attacks on Asylum Law, ABA (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.american
bar.org/groups/diversity/women/publications/perspectives/2019/september/at-border-andbeyond-women-lawyers-defend-unprecedented-attacks-asylum-law/ [https://perma.cc/HS8L
-HEF4].
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overworked and understaffed.283 Thus, such lawyers are needed more than
ever.284
Were there an incentive structure in place—such as an unfettered feeshifting provision within this newly proposed Refugee Act—then perhaps more
lawyers would be motivated to consider devoting their time towards this cause.
Since Buckhannon, the definition of who qualifies as a “prevailing party,” for
fee-shifting purposes, has been narrowed.285 Catherine Albiston and Laura Beth
Nielsen, in their research of over 200 public interest organizations, have
documented how this ruling has indeed chilled lawyers from pursuing certain
claims, because of a worry that they will not be reimbursed.286
The question is whether Buckhannon has rendered fee-shifting provisions
completely valueless for these lawyers. Albiston and Nielson paint a bleak
picture, noting that “Buckhannon . . . may signal an ominous shift of power
away from private enforcement of rights toward government power both to
resist civil rights mandates and to control the enforcement of these rights.”287
But at the same time, as this Article has shown, claimants have not given up
entirely, and many continue to fight tooth-and-nail to be able to recover legal
fees.
Ultimately, given that the Supreme Court has not stepped in to resolve the
jurisdictional split within the federal courts, what is left is a system where the
ability of asylum seekers to access lawyers depends upon what circuit oversees
their initial port of entry. That situation is fundamentally arbitrary and unfair.
As such, the hope is that Congress will take legislative action to remedy these
circumstances in the very near future.
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